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SHAREHOLDERS' PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS-'
ALEXANDER HAMILTON FREY
When a corporation, acting through its board of directors,
proposes to increase the number of its shares then outstanding,
existing shareholders have a variety of rights with respect there-
to. For instance, a shareholder has a right that statutory pro-
visions be complied with in the matter of the creation of
additional shares; he has a light that there be no "overissue"
of shares; under some circumstances, he has a right that no
new shares be created for less than their reasonable sale value;
and under other circumstances, he has a right to have offered
to him (to "subscribe" for) a proportion of the proposed shares
before such opportunity is offered to others. This article is con-
cerned exclusively with an analysis of this last-mentioned right.
Herein this right is designated as a shareholder's pre-emptive
right.
Orthologically, pre-emption is the right of purchasing before
others, and much confusion has resulted from the common prac-
tice of textwriters and commentators of using the term pre-
emptive right to include two separate and distinct rights: (1)
the right of a shareholder that, if the corporation proposes to
create new shares at less than a certain price, he be offered the
first opportunity to purchase a proportion thereof at the price
* The substance of this article constituted a paper presented by the
author at the Section on Business Associations of the Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools, December, 1927. The materials -were collected largely
in connection with the author's work on the American Law Institute's
Restatement of Business Associations, Tentative Draft No. 1, including sec-
tions 11 to 19, dealing with pre-emptive rights, wa submitted to the Coun-
cil of the Institute in April, 1927. '
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offered; here he has no absolute right of first purchase, for his
right arises only if the shares are offered, for example, at less
than their reasonable sale value; and (2) the right of a share-
holder, no matter at what price the corporation proposes to
create the new shares, that a proportion thereof be first offered
-to him. Throughout this paper the term "shareholder's pre-
emptive right" will be employed only with reference to this latter
right.,
In short, if a given transaction resulting, or which would re-
sult, in the creation of additional shares does not contravene
the right of a shareholder to a first offering of a particular
proportion of the shares, the shareholder has, under the cir-
cumstances of such transaction, no pre-emptive right, although
he may have other rights which the transaction violates. This
distinction is obvious in those cases in which the articles of
association of a corporation expressly deny to the shareholders
the right to subscribe proportionately to new shares; 2 here share-
holders have no pre-emptive rights, although the creation of a
particular block of shares may be in derogation of their rights
that additional shares be not created at a price which will ad-
versely affect their interests in net earnings or net assets.
The orthodox statement as to the pre-emptive ights of share-
holders to be found in such well known treatises as those of
Ballantine, 3 Cook,4 Fletchers Morawetz,r Machen and Thomp-
son 8 is that "every shareholder has a right to subscribe propor-
tionately to any increase in the capital stock of his corporation."
What are the implications of such an assertion? The key word
is, of course, "proportionately," but to what proportion of addi-
tional shares which his corporation is about to create has a given
shareholder a claim? In the early stages of corporate finance
when but one class of shares was known, such a rule was clear
I If it be objected that this is not the "true" meaning of "pre-emptive
right" I should welcome the substitution of any term that seems more feas-
ible as a description of the right in question; the subject matter of this
article will remain unchanged whatever name may be applied to it.
2 An example of this denial of pre-emptive rights is the provision in
the certificate of incorporation of the General Motors Corporation that "No
holder of stock of the corporation of whatever class shall have a profer-
ential right of subscription to any shares of any class of the corporation
issued or sold, or to be issued or sold, or to any obligations convertible into
the stock of the corporation, nor any right of subscription to any thereof,
other than such, if any, as the Board of Directors in its discretion may
determine... .'
& BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (192.7) § 135.
4 COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) § 286.
"5 "FLETCHER, CoRPoRATIONs (191.7) § 3462.
6,MORAWETZ, CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1886) § 455.
7 MACHEN, CORPORATIONS (1908) § 603.
s THODPSON, CORRATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 3668.
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and easily administered and therefore adequate.0 But today with
the complexity of the share structure of many moderm corpora-
tions, with the number of varying types of shares limited only by
the ingenuity of corporate mentors and their financial needs, this
rule, which developed during comparatively simple conditions,
cannot feasibly be applied to the prevailing situation. And why
not? Apparently, in the earliest cases dealing with pre-emptive
rights, the shares involved were what would now probably be
called colnmon, voting shares of a uniform par value. That is
to say, there being but one class of shares, these shares were
not preferred as to dividends payment and not limited to any
maximum amount of dividends, and were similarly unpreferred
and unlimited as to capital distributions,' for example, upon
dissolution.
Probably the need for additional capital plus a reluctance to
borrow money eventually induced some corporation to create a
new type of shares the holders of which were given a preference
over common shareholders in the distribution, of dividends of,
say, six dollars per share per year. In all other respects such
shares were most likely on a parity with common shares; if so,
the holders of these preferred shares were not limited in the
event of dividend payments to the amount of the preference, and
were both unpreferred and unlimited with respect to capital
distributions. With reference only to dividend payments, such
shares might be described as "participating preferred."
The idea of a preference once having been established, it was
but natural that before long there should be created shares the
holders of which, while preferred as to dividends to a stated
amount, were limited to that amount or a stated maximum in
9 The earliest American case recognizing the exdstence of shareholders'
pre-emptive rights is that of Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Brass. 363 (1807).
0 The term "dividend payments" as here used means distribution of net
earnings or surplus by a solvent, functioning corporation (a "going con-
cern"). The term "capital distributions" as here used means all other
payments by a corporation to its shareholders; "capital distributions" in
this sense may take place by a going concern, as where shares are retired
or redeemed, as well as by a corporation in the process of liquidation, dis-
solution, or reorganization. "Capital distributions" may be more (or lezs)
than the par value of the shares, as when holders of shares having $100
par value are entitled to receive $110 per share upon retirement or disso-
lution. "Capital distributions" may be less as well as more than the amount
contributed to the corporate enterprise by shareholders, as -here a portion
of the amount paid to a corporation for share is immediately allocated to
surplus; and an increment of "capital distributions" may even include pay-
ments on account of accrued dividends, as in the case of retirement of
cumulative preferred shares. In short, "capital distributions" is a term
arbitrarily selected, as there seems to be no other in current use, to indicate
all payments by a corporation to its shareholders other than payments out
of net earnings or surplus by a corporation not in the process of dissolution
or of retirement of shares.
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excess thereof. Insofar as dividend payments are concerned,
such shares might be termed "non-participating preferred."
The final development has been the creation of shares the
holders of which are unpreferred as to dividends yet limited to
a maximum amount of the net earnings of any given year; with
respect merely to dividend payments, such shares might be desig-
nated as "deferred."
Thus as to dividend payments alone, there are today four
groups of shares: (1) common, i.e., unpreferred and uhlimited,
(2) participating preferred, i.e., preferred and unlimited, (3)
non-participating preferred, i.e., preferred and limited, and (4)
deferred, i.e., unpreferred and limited. Obviously, shares may
be created having with respect to capital distributions any one
of these four combinations of incidents, depending upon whether
the share is preferred or unpreferred, limited or unlimited, as
to capital distributions. And as each one of these four types as
to dividend payments may be combined with any one of the four
as to capital distributions, sixteen different groups of shares
are possible,u taking into consideration only the presence or
11 The sixteen classes are as follows:
(1) Preferred and limited as to dividends, preferred and limited as to
capital.
(2) Preferred but unlimited as to dividends, preferred and limited as to
capital.
(3) Preferred and limited as to dividends, preferred but unlimited as to
capital.
(4) Preferred but unlimited as to dividends, preferred but unlimited as
to capital.
(5) Preferred and limited as to dividends, unpreferred and unlimited
as to capital.
(6) Preferred but unlimited as to dividends, unpreferred and unlimited
as to capital.
(7) Preferred and limited as to dividends, unpreferred but limited as
to capital.
(8) Preferred but unlimited as to dividends, unpreferred but limited as
to capital.
(9). Unpreferred but limited as to dividends, preferred and limited as to
capital.
(10) Unpreferred and unlimited as to dividends, preferred and limited as
to capital.
(11) Unpreferred but limited as to dividends, preferred but unlimited as
to capital.
(12) Unpreferred and unlimited as to dividends, preferred but unlimited
as to capital.
(13) Unpreferred but limited as to dividends, unpreferred and unlimited
as to capital.
(14) Unpreferred and unlimited as to dividends, unpreferred and un-
limited as to capital.
(15) Unpreferred but limited as to dividends, unpreferred but limited
as to capital.
(16) Unpreferred and unlimited as to dividends, unpreferred but limited
as to capital.
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absence of a preference or limitation, both as to dividend pay-
ments and capital distributions."
When only those other share incidents thus far invented are
applied to each of these groups, the number of possible classes
of shares becomes staggering. For example, each group may
be voting or non-voting; and even voting rights may be of a
number of different classes; voting may be cumulative or non-
cumulative; some shares which normally carry no voting rights
may acquire voting rights upon certain conditions, such as the
passing of three successive dividends, while others may lose
normal voting rights upon similar conditions; some shares may
entitle the holder to vote for directors but upon no other matters;
others may exclude the holder from voting for directors but
permit him to vote on other questions. Each group of shares
may be of a par value or of no par value; the par value may
be of any conceivable amount. The preference as to dividends
may be cumulative or non-cumulative, and the preference both
as to dividends and capital may be of various amounts. The
shares may be convertible or non-convertible, redeemable or non-
redeemable, and the shares may even limit the rights of the
holder to dividend payments and exclude him entirely from par-
ticipation in capital distributions."-3 When confronted w,ith such
=ZClass 1 is the ordinary form of non-participating preferred share.
Examples of Class 2 are the '/% preferred shares of A. M. Byers Co. and
the preferred shares of American Products Co., both of which are par-
ticipating as to dividend payments, but non-participating as to capital dis-
tributions. An example of Class 3 is the preferred shares of Maple Leaf
Milling Co. of Ontario, which as to dividend payments are limited to the
amount of their preference, but which, while preferred, are not limited as
to capital distributions in the event of dissolution. An excellent example
of Class 4 is the so-called Class A common shares of the Burns Bros. coal
corporation which are preferred but not limited to the amount of the prefer-
ence, both as to dividend payments and capital distributions. The 7%
preferred shares of the National Biscuit Co. are an illustration of Class
5, being limited to the amount of their preference as to dividends, but
participating equally with the common shares in a distribution of "assets!"
Shares illustrating Class 6 are of increasing frequency, although they are
usually called "Class A common" shares, a contradiction in terms inasmuch
as they are accorded a preference over the common shares to a designated
extent in dividend payments, -while participating on a parity-with the com-
mon as to further dividend payments or as to capital distributions; for
illustrations see the "Class A common" shares of Isaac Benesch & Sons, Inc.,
or of the Illinois Pacific Glass Corporation. Class 14 is, of course, the case
of the ordinary common share. Class 15 is well illustrated by the shares of
the Citizens Gas Company of Indianapolis, which are limited to a maximum
annual dividend of 10%, net earnings in excess of that amount being avail-
able for the retirement of the shares, and the property of the Company
passing to the City when all the shares have been retired. Examples of
the remaining classes would, in any event, be rare, and none have as yet
come to my notice.
13 See, for example, the Dividend Participations involved in Bodell v. Gen-
eral Gas & Electric Co., 132 Atl. 442 (Del. 1926).
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a maze of possible classes of shares, how is the proportionate
claim of any given shareholder to shares of a particular class
to be determined in relation to shareholders of other classes?
When shares have certain incidents in common but are not
identical, how is the relative importance of specific incidents
to be evaluated in determining the proportionate distribution
of new shares to the respective existing shareholders?
These and similar queries indicate that, in the light of modern
complex share structures, the orthodox pre-emptive right rule
that "every shareholder has a right to subscribe proportionately
to any increase in the capital stock of his corporation" is either
unjustifiably arbitrary or impossible of rational application."
14 A few examples may help to demonstrate the inadequacy of the ortho-
dox pre-emptive right rule:
Case 1: Corporation C has outstanding 1000 voting, common shares (un-
preferred and unlimited both as to dividend payments and capital distri-
butions) and 1000 voting shares preferred and unlimited as to dividend
payments, and preferred and limited as to capital distributions; Corpo-
ration C purposes creating 1000 non-voting common shares at their reason-
able sale value; since both of the existing classes of shares entitle the
respective holders to unlimited participation in dividend payments, why
should the common shareholders be given a right to have the proposed ad-
ditional common shares offered exclusively to them? Upon what basis
should the additional common shares be apportioned between the existing
common and preferred shareholders? Why, under the circumstances in-
dicated, should there be any apportionment?
Case 2: Same facts as in Case 1, except that the shares Corporation C
purposes creating at their reasonable sale value are 1000 non-voting shares
on a parity with the outstanding preferred shares with respect to dividends,
but unpreferred and unlimited as to capital distributions; such shares have
the dividend incidents of the outstanding preferred shares and are iden-
tical with the outstanding common shares except for the preference as to
dividends and the absence of voting power. What is the proportion of
these new shares to which each existing shareholder is entitled? Is there
any logical basis upon which these new shares can be fairly apportioned?
Is there any necessity for apportionment under the circumstances out-
lined?
Case 3: Corporation C has outstanding 1000 voting common shares and
1000 non-voting common shares and purposes creating 1000 additional vot-
ing common shares at their reasonable sale value. How should these ad-
ditional shares be apportioned among the outstanding shareholders?
Should non-voting shareholders ever have pre-emptive rights as to voting
shares?
Case 4: Corporation C has outstanding 1,000 voting common shares and
1000 voting shares preferred and limited both as to dividend payment and
capital distributions; Corporation C purposes creating 1000 additional vot-
ing common shares at their reasonable sale value. How should these
additional shares be apportioned among the outstanding shareholders?
When additional voting shares are about to be created, should a voting
shareholder always have a pre-emptive right to that proportion thereof
which the number of voting shares he possesses bears to the total number of
voting shares then outstanding, regardless of whether or not his shares
are in other respects of the' same class as the voting shares about to be
created?
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That there is, however, some form of pre-emptive right is settled
beyond reasonable dispute, whatever one may think of the de-
sirability of the existence of such a rule. Having thus far
attempted to demonstrate what this rule of pre-emption is not,
I now purpose considering what it is. The solution lies in the
answer to the question, to whom and in what proportions must
new shares of various classes be first offered.
At this point it might be well to recall the alleged reasons why
the common law developed the orthodox pre-emptive right rule
as to corporations having but one class of shares. The basis most
frequently asserted for the existence in a shareholder of a right
to have offered to him a proportion of additional shares about to
be created is that he may thereby be enabled to maintain his
proportionate interest in the voting control of the corporation,
and his interest in its net assets and net earnings. It will be ob-
served that the pre-emptive right is thus a secondary right, aris-
ing only to prevent some other or primary right from being
violated. Consequently, a shareholder has no pre-emptive right
with respect to the creation of new shares unless the creation of
such shares will in some material way adversely affect at least
one of his interests in the corporation; '1 if the reason for the
rule disappears, the rule itself must vanish, especially where its
extension to a new field is sought.
Is the right of a shareholder that his interest in the net assets
shall not be diminished by the creation of additional shares one
which can or ought to be protected by pre-emption? Obviously
this right concerns itself exclusively with the priec at which such
new shares shall be created and not with the persons to whom
they may be sold. If additional shares are about to be created
at a price which will not diminish a given shareholder's interest
in the net assets, what right has he, in so far as his interest in
net assets is concerned, that some proportion of such shares be
offered to him? And if a corporation, having several classes of
shares outstanding, is about to create additional shares at a price
which will adversely affect the interests in the net assets of the
shareholders of one or more of these classes, are we not back to
the original problem of the impossibility of determining a ra-
tional basis upon which such additional shares can be appor-
tioned?
For example, Corporation C has outstanding 1000 voting com-
mon shares, and 1000 non-voting shares, which are preferred
and limited as to dividend payments, but on an equal footing with
common shares as to capital distributions. Under such circum-
stances, the respective interests of common and preferred share-
holders in net assets is not nearly so simple of solution as might
3 See General Investment Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 88 X. J. Eq. 237,
102 AtL 252 (1917).
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at first appear. But assume, if you will, that owing to apprecia-
tion in the value of fixed assets both common and preferred
shareholders would each receive $150.00 were dissolution to take
place at once. Corporation C now purposes creating an addi-
tional 1000 voting, common shares at $100.00 per share. If these
new shares be created exclusively in the old common shareholders
and dissolution were to be effected immediately thereafter, ob-
viously the preferred shareholders would then receive less than
$150.00 per share. How then should these additional shares be
apportioned? Fifty-fifty among common and preferred share-
holders? Are non-voting shareholders to be allotted voting
shares? Are shareholders who are limited to a maximum divi-
dend to receive shares ivhich may participate to the hilt in the
corporation's net earnings? Or are the preferred shareholders
merely to be accorded a right to enjoin the creation of these ad-
ditional common shares at less than their reasonable sale price,
with the additional right against the corporation to compensation
to the extent of their damage if the shares are created before an
injunction might reasonably be obtained?
The right of a shareholder that his interest in the net assets
shall not be diminished by the creation of additional shares is
a very real and important right with. many interesting ramifica-
tions. While a corporation may be able under certain circum-
stances to protect itself from violating this right by voluntarily
offering a shareholder an adequate proportion of new shares,
nevertheless this right of a shareholder with respect to net assets
is quite distinct from a right to be offered a proportion of pro-
posed new shares, and not until courts and writers cease jum-
bling it up with the pre-emptive right will it receive the detailed
and separate treatment that it requires.
This leads to. the question of proportionate interest in the net
earnings as a possible basis for establishing a pre-emptive right
rule. Has a shareholder, even where his corporation is author-
ized to create but one class of shares, a legal right that his pres-
ent interest in the net earnings shall not be diminished by the
creation of additional shares? Suppose Corporation C has an
authorized capital stock of 2000 common shares of $100.00 par
value each, 1000 of which are outstanding, and that the annual
net earnings and paid dividends of the corporation for a number
of years have been $5 per share. If the corporation now creates
an additional 1000 shares at $100.00 per share, which we shall
assume is the reasonable sale value of the outstanding shares,
the present interest in net earnings of the old shareholders will
be diminished, even though the new shares are allotted to them,
unless the corporation can utilize the additional $100,000.00 re-
ceived through the creatipn of the new shares at least as profit-
ably as the $100,000.00 already invested in the enterprise. On
570
SHAREHOLDERS' PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS
the other hand, the additional capital may enable an e xpansion
that will more than double the corporation's total net earnings.
If the corporation were earning and paying $20.00 per share on
the old shares, their reasonable sale value would probably be
around $400.00 per share, and if the corporation were to issue
the new shares at $400.00 apiece, it would have to earn only
about 5% and not 20% on the additional $400,000.00 thus ac-
quired, in order that the interest in net earnings of old share-
holders would be not adversely affected. Will the law concern
itself with a matter so highly speculative as the effect of th
creation of additional shares upon the interest in net earnings
of an existing shareholder, especially if the possible effect o.
this interest is his sole basis of complaint as to a proposed or
accomplished share issue?
There would appear to be no case in which the effect upon
a shareholder's interest in net earnings has been recognized as
the basis for a pre-emptive right, even though only one class
of shares was involved. As it would seem patent that, when
more than one class of shares is outstanding, the same impos-
sibility of rational apportionment based upon interest in net
earnings exists as in those instances where interest in net assets
is claimed as the basis of such apportionment, the rejection of a
shareholder's interest in net earnings as a legal or logical reason
for a pre-emptive right rule would seem justified.
Of the bases for pre-emption most commonly suggested there
remains to be considered only a shareholder's proportionate in-
terest in voting control. And here quite different problems are
involved than those heretofore discussed.
A chorus of rather querulous voices has lately arisen in protest
against the growing practice of creating non-voting common
shares-the burden of their complaint is that this so-called
divorcing of ownership from control is somehow detrimental to
the best interests of society.10 'With this tirade I find myself not
entirely in sympathy. But it is one thing to create shares with-
out voting rights, and quite another to deprive an existing share-
holder of his proportionate interest in the voting control of his
corporation. Where such voting rights exist, this interest war-
rants the highest degree of protection, for in these days when
the courts are giving recognition to the ever-expanding province
of the board of directors as managers of the corporate enterprise,
their election by those shareholders who have not deliberately
foregone this privilege stands out as one of the few remaining
forms of shareholder control over the enterprise.
In this connection it should be observed that.voting shares
have a block value; for example, if Corporation C has 100,000
voting shares outstanding, of which shareholder X holds 30,000,
16, See RnLEY, MAxi STm= AN WALL STm=-T (1927).
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his block of voting shares will have a value in excess of 30,000
times the value of one voting share. Furthermore, the voting
strength of shareholder X in relation to other shareholders is
an important factor. If, for instance, the remaining 70,000 vot-
ing shares are widely scattered, X's 30,000 voting shares will
have a greater value than if the other 70,000 shares are held by
a small group of persons, for it is well known that in the case
of large corporations whose shares are not closely held, consider-
ably less than a majority of the voting shares outstanding is
normally adequate for control of shareholders' meetings.
In our search for the basis of a pre-emptive right rule, three
pHinary distinctions may be noted between a shareholder's pro-
portionate interest in voting control and his interests in net as-
sets and net earnings. In the first place, there is nothing
speculative about the diminution of a voting shareholder's pro-
portionate interest in voting control if additional voting shares
are created and none are offered to him. Consider a simple case:
Corporation C has outstanding 100 voting shares of which X
holds 45, Y 35, and Z 20; Corporation C is about to create 100
additional voting shares. Obviously unless X is offered at least
that proportion of the new shares which the number of voting
shares he now holds bears to the total number of voting shares
outstanding, his proportionate interest in voting control will be
adversely affected, and the same is equally true of Y and Z.
Secondly, the only way for a voting shareholder to maintain
undiminished his proportionate interest in voting control when
additional voting shares are about to be created is for him to
have an opportunity to take that proportion of the new voting
shares which corresponds to his present fraction of voting con-
trol. If an existing voting shareholder is offered none of the
proposed new voting shares, his proportionate interest in voting
control will inevitably be diminished at whatever price such
shares may be created, or however great may be the opportuni-
ties for profitably employing the additional capital.
And in the third place, a pre-emptive right rule based exclu-
sively upon proportionate voting control is feasible, regardless
of how complex the share structure of a corporation may be.
It is possible to determine with mathematical precision the pro-
portion of total voting control which each existing shareholder,
common or preferred, has at the time when additional voting
shares are about to be created, and to allot to him that proportion
of the new voting shares, regardless of what the other charac-
teristics of the new shares may be; and as I have already en-
deavored to demonstrate any other basis of apportionment of new
shares is either irrational or unworkable.
For these reasons, then, I would suggest that the pre-emptive
rights rule is as follows: unless otherwise provided by statute
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or in the articles of association, every holder of voting shares
has a right that the corporation shall not create any voting
shares, or other securities convertible into such shares, without
first offering to him that proportion thereof which the number of
votes possessed by him at a time reasonably fixed by the board
of directors bears to the total number of votes then possessed by
all voting shareholders.17 If it be objected that, however desir-
able this rule might be, it is an innovation, and not the common-
law rule as to shareholders' pre-emptive rights, this I must
strenuously deny.
An exhaustive search has revealed eighty-seven American
cases dealing with various phases of the pre-emptive right prob-
lem; of these, all but eleven , relate to corporations having only
one class of shares outstanding at the time of the proposed crea-
tion of additional shares.o Thus, in the overwhelming majority
of existing cases, the court was not confronted with the necessity
of selecting one of divers incidents of the existing shares as the
basis for a right of pre-emption, inasmuch as each share involved
the same interests as every other share. And this is reflected
in the opinions for, as has been heretofore noted, although many
of the courts advert to the importance of protecting a share-
holder's interest in net earnings and net assets as well as in
IT This is substantially, although not exactly, the practically unanimous
opinion of those engaged in the American Law Institute's Restatement of
Business Associations as to what the pre-emptive right is. See LxIv oF
BusINEss ASSOCIATIONS RESTATEAMNT, Tentative Draft No. 1 (Am. L.
Inst.) §§ 12 et seq.
is Stone v. U. S. Envelope Co., 119 Me. 394, 111 Atl. 536 (1920); Page
v. Whittenton Mfg. Co., 211 Mass. 424, 97 N. E. 1006 (1912); Jones v.
Concord & Montreal R. R., 67 N. H. 234, 30 Atl. 614 (1892); General In-
vestment Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 87 N. J. Eq. 234, 100 Atl. 347 (1917),
General Investment Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., -upra note 15; Page v.
American & British Mfg. Co., 129 App. Div. 34G, 113 N. Y. Supp. 734 (1st
Dep't 1908); Russell v. American Gas & Electric Co., 152 App. Div. 136,
136 N. Y. Supp. 602, (1st Dep't 1912); Branch & Co. v. Riverside Mills,
139 Va. 291, 123 S. E. 542 (1924); Riverside Mills v. Branch & Co., 147
Va. 509, 137 S. E. 620 (1927), 52 A. L. R. 220 (1928); Weidenfeld v.
Northern Pacific R. R., 129 Fed. 305 (C. C. A. Sth, 1904); Borg v. Interna-
tional Silver Co., 11 F. (2d) 147 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
19 The reason for this paucity of such cases is probably that where corpo-
rations have a complex share structure their articles of association either
negative the existence of pre-emptive rights or contain such detailed provi-
sions with respect thereto that controversies are forestalled or, more likely
still, such corporations, in creating additional shares, have thus far man-
aged to make arrangements satisfactory to all shareholders who could not
be bought off. But any day a case may arise in which the proposal for the
creation of additional shares by a corporation having several classes of
shares outstanding will not be satisfactory to the existing shareholders,
or in which the validity of provisions in the articles of association either
denying or arbitrarily regulating pre-emptive rights will be tested. Indeed,
Professor Ripley has already viewed with alarm such charter provisions,
and recent questionable developments in corporate financing seem to indi-
cate that he is hardly tilting at a windmill.
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voting control, no generally accepted theory as to the basis for
pre-emption is to be found in the cases. Nor is this surprising,
for the protection afforded to one of the interests of a share-
holder by a right of pre-emption is necessarily afforded to all
his interests where but one class of shares is outstanding.
But where a corporation has two or more classes of shares
outstanding, the totality of the interests represented by each
class differs from the totality of interests of every other class;
consequently it is, under most circumstances, not possible to
create more shares of one class or shares of a new class without
disturbing one or more of the proportionate interests of another
class or classes, no matter how the additional shares may be ap-
portioned among the existing shareholders. The particular in-
terests in voting control, dividend payments and capital
distributions of a share of a given class can no more be added
together, in an attempt to arrive at the total "interest" in the
corporation represented by the share, than a doughnut can be
added to the square root of two. A "weighted average" of the
differing interests of shares of various classes being impossible,
there can be no rational method of apportioning additional shares
among holders of the shares of different classes except on the
basis of an interest (or interests) prevailing in all of the existing
shares.
The few cases which have thus far arisen involving the respec-
tive rights of existing shareholders of different classes to a first
offering of new shares have, with one possible exception,2 been
cases in which all the shares participated in voting control and
the courts have been most alert in protecting a shareholder's
proportionate voting strength.
In Russell v. American Gas & Electric Co.,21 a holder of voting
preferred shares sought to restrain a proposed creation of voting
common shares at par unless both the preferred shareholders
and the common shareholders were permitted upon the same
terms to subscribe thereto. The market value of the common
shares was then about $30 per share above par. The injunction
was denied, but only upon the condition that the preferred share-
holders be allowed to subscribe for an equivalent amount of the
preferred shares at par, despite the fact that the preferred shares
were non-participating, both as to dividend payments and capital
20Weidenfeld v. Northern Pacific R. R., supra note 18. This is merely a
case in which a common shareholder sought to enjoin the consummation of
a plan involving the creation of additional common shares on the ground
that the existing holders of participating preferred shares had not been
offered an opportunity to subscribe proportionately to such common shares;
in dismissing the petition the court observed that the plaintiff was "not





distributions. Since the only adverse effect upon the holders of
such preferred shares by the creation of additional common
shares at less than their market value would relate to their pro-
portionate voting control, the condition upon which the injunc-
tion was granted must have been motivated by a desire to
protect this voting interest.
In Brauch & Co. v. Riverside etc. Mills,2- voting preferred
shareholders sued at law to redress a violation of their alleged
rights resulting from the creation of additional common shares,
exclusively as to the existing common shareholders, at less than
their market value. The preferred shares were non-participat-
ing as to dividend payments, but on the same basis as the com-
mon shares with respect to capital distributions. The court held
that each shareholder, whether common or preferred, had a right
to subscribe to that proportion of the new common shares which
the number of shares held by him bore to the total number of
shares of both classes then outstanding, and awarded damages
measured by the difference between the market value of the com-
mon shares at the time of the increase and the price at which
they were created. Here again, the court appears to be stressing
the importance of the voting interest of the preferred share-
holders, inasmuch as their interests in dividend payments were
not adversely affected by the creation of the new common shares,
and as there was nothing to indicate whether the high market
value of the common shares was due to accumulated earnings or
to unearned appreciation in the fixed assets of the corporation.
In Page v. Whittenton Mfg. Co.,23 the court refused to enjoin
the consummation of a plan, authorized by statute, whereby the
8,000 common voting shares outstanding were to be reduced to
1,000, while the 2,000 voting preferred shares were all to be
permitted to remain outstanding, and common shares were there-
after to be created as to the common shareholders and preferred
shareholders in the proportion obtaining after the reduction
rather than before. Since the preferred shares were participat-
ing as to dividend payments, and possibly as to capital distribu-
tion (this does not clearly appear), and as the entire plan had
statutory sanction, this case sheds little light upon the underlying
basis for pre-emption.
A somewhat similar case, also involving the reduction of the
number of common shares outstanding, is Page v. American &
British Mfg. Co. 24 At a time when 80,000 voting common shares
and 20,000 voting preferred shares were outstanding, the major-
ity of the shareholders voted to reduce the authorized capital
stock to 20,000 voting common shares, and 20,000 voting pre-
- Supra note 18. See also Riverside MiUs v. Branch & Co., supra note 18.
s Supra note 18.
24Supra note 18.
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ferred shares. In an action by a transferee of common shares
to compel the corporation to issue a new certificate to him, the
court held that this reduction was "illegal," solely on the ground
that it would disturb the proportionate voting control of the com-
mon and the preferred shareholders, saying:
"The effect of the action taken is to give the holders
of preferred stock, who only contribute one-fifth of the
capital, an equal vote and voice in the management of
the corporation with the holders of the common stock,
who contributed four-fifths of the capital, and it reduces
the voting power and authority of the stock owned by
the plaintiff four-fifths without any reduction in the
voting power or the authority of the preferred stock."
In Stone v. U. S. Envelope Co.,25 a voting common shareholder
was granted an injunction restraining the corporation from per-
mitting voting preferred shareholders to participate in a pro-
posed increase of voting common shares, the preferred shares
being construed by the court to be non-participating both as to
dividend payments and capital distributions. The injunction was
granted on the ground that since the additional common shares
were being offered at materially less than their market value,
the preferred shares would be receiving, in effect, a dividend in
excess of the amount to which they were limited, if permitted to
subscribe for the new common shares at the price offered. The
case contains no discussion of the proportionate voting interests
of the respective classes of shares, and there id nothing to indi-
cate that a similar injunction would not have been granted to
preferred shareholders restraining the issuance of voting com-
mon shares exclusively to common shareholders, on the ground
that this would reduce the voting power of the preferred shares.
In Jones v. Concord & Montreal R. R.,20 the court refused to
grant an injunction restraining the corporation from permitting
all classes of shareholders to subscribe for additional common
shares at par in proportion to their respective holdings. There
were four classes of shares outstanding, all of which voted and
participated equally as to capital distributions, but Classes 1, 2
and 3 were limited to their respective preferences as to dividend
payments. The market value of the common shares was above
par, but the court emphasized that "it does not appear what the
new company has earned or what disposition has been made of
its earnings. They may have been properly paid out in dividends,
or to creditors of the Montreal, or properly expended in the main-
tenance or improvement of the road. The excess of value of the
new stock above par may be a consequence of the union. It
25Supra note 18.
26 Supra note 18.
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may arise from a recent or an old and long-continued advance
in the value of the corporate plant."
One of the Bethlehem Steel 27 cases merely involved a power of
the corporation to create non-voting common shares and the
other was principally concerned with the power of the corpora-
tion to create preferred shares taking a priority over existing
preferred shares. The Borg28 case was decided on the ground
that pre-emptive rights do not apply to "treasury shares."
This review of the cases involving an apportionment of new
shares between existing shareholders of different classes of
shares would seem to justify the conclusion that a rule of pre-
emption based upon proportionate interest in voting control is
not contrary to the present state of American case law. More-
over, while it is true that today the overwhelming majority of
corporations still has but one class of shares outstanding, a rule
of pre-emption based upon voting rights is applicable to all such
corporations as the single class of shares inevitably must include
voting incidents.
The new Ohio Corporation Act limits pre-emptive rights to
holders of shares of the same class as those about to be created, =3
and the Uniform Business Corporations Act adopted last June
by the National Conference bases such provisions as to appor-
tionment of new shares as it contains upon this Ohio rule.-3
Such a rule of pre-emption is unsupported by authority, illogical
in its conception and fraught with possibilities of grave injustice
in its applicatior. Two principal objections to such a rule stand
out: in the first place it hampers the corporation by requiring
it invariably to apportion new shares of a given class among all
the existing holders of shares of that class, even though such old
shareholders would be in no way adversely affected by not re-
27Supra, note 18.
28 Supra note 18.
29 Ohio Laws 1927, § 8623-35: "Except as otherwise provided in the
articles, the holders of shares of any class of a corporation shall, upon the
sale for cash of shares of the same class, have the right, during a reason-
able time to be fixed by the board of directors, to purchase such shares in
proportion to their respective holdings of shares of such class, at such
price as may be fixed in the manner hereinbefore provided .... Shares of
a class of which none are outstanding shall not be subject to pre-emptive
rights.'
30 The tenth draft of the Uniform Business Corporation Act, tentatively
approved by the National Conference in 1927, contained a section ex\pressly
limiting pre-emption to voting shares, unless otherwise provided in the
articles. The Act as finally approved in 1928 appears to contain no pro-
visions as to pre-emptive rights. Section 24, covering dividends, does, how-
ever, contain this provision: 'VI (c) no dividend payable in shares of any
class shall be paid to shareholders of any other class unless the articles
so provide or such payment is authorized by the vote of the holders of a
majority of the shares of the class in which the payment is to be made."
This is an unfortunate adaptation of section 38 of the new Ohio Act.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
ceiving an aliquot portion of the new shares; and, secondly, it
offers no safeguard to the holders of shares of a class different
from those about to be created against an unwarranted reduc-
tion of their proportionate voting control. The possibilities of
legalized chicanery by those temporarily in the corporate saddle
which such a rule of pre-emption presents are patent and ap-
palling.
WHO ARE VOTING SHAREHOLDERS?
In view of the complex provisions sometimes appearing in
corporate charters with respect to voting rights, an understand-
ing of a rule of pre-emption based upon proportionate voting
control requires some consideration of who may be regarded as
voting shareholders at any given time. Occasionally the holders
of some shares are entitled to vote only for directors but upon
no other matters; and in some few instances a particular class
of shareholders is accorded the right to vote on questions other
than the election of directors. In the rule of pre-emption herein
set forth the term "voting shares" applies to all shares the
holders of which have a right to vote in the election of directors
regardless of other limitations on their voting rights, and ex-
cludes all shares the owners of which are not entitled to vote for
directors, even though they may have other voting rights.
It should also be noted that by express provision in the ar-
ticles of association, a particular class of voting shares may be
subject to either a total or a partial loss of voting rights upon
the happening of a stipulated condition such as the passing of
three successive dividends on preferred shares; similarly a class
of shares may acquire voting rights or additional voting ights
upon the happening of a condition expressed in the articles of
association. The happening of the condition may be exceedingly
remote, or it may be quite imminent. If a particular change in
the voting rights will inevitably take place in the very near
future, although the condition upon which it rests may not
actually have occurred as yet, there is little doubt but that the
courts would regard those about to acquire voting rights as vot-
ing shareholders, and those about to lose voting rights as non-
voting shareholders, insofar as the rule of pre-emption is
concerned. For example, if such shift in voting control were
conditioned on the passing of three successive preferred divi-
dends and two had already been passed, and no funds were
available for the payment of, the third dividend, although the
date therefor was practically at hand, the preferred shareholders
would, in all probability, be regarded as having exclusive voting
control if the directors proposed to create an additional block of
voting shares shortly before the arrival of this third dividend
date.
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DO PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS APPLY WHERE SHARES ARE CREATED FOR
PROPERTY OR SERVICES?
Although the statement not infrequently appears that pre-
emptive rights do not exist where shares are created in return
for property or services,3 neither logically nor on authority can
this distinction be supported. There are but five American
cases 32 in which the pre-emptive right where shares are created
in exchange for property or services has been even discussed.
Of these cases, Meredith ,. N. J. Zinc & Iron Co.23 is the only
one which contains anything remotely resembling an authorita-
tive holding on this point.
In that case a shareholder sought to enjoin the creation of
shares in exchange for property of peculiar value and not other-
wise procurable, on the ground that he had not been offered his
proportion of the proposed shares. While the injunction was
denied, it should be noted (1) that at the trial counsel for de-
fendant offered to the complainant to insure to him the right to
purchase at par such proportion of the proposed shares as he
would be entitled to under the rule relied upon; (2) that al-
though the court denied the injunction, it did not deny the
existence of a pre-emptive right with respect to shares created
for property, for Vice-Chancellor Pitney, who delivered the
opinion, specifically stated, "Besides it is well held in such cases
that, in case the corporation deprives a stockholder of his rights
in this behalf, it is liable to an action at law for damages, and
there is no suggestion that the zinc company is not of sufficient
responsibility to answer to such action;" 34 and (3) the case of
WaR v. Utah Copper Co. 35 somewhat weakens the effect of the
M1leredith decision, as Pitney in this later case deprecates his
former opinion.
The Bonnzet case 3 involved the creation of shares upon a con-
solidation; and the Boz case-" and the Archer case,:3 as vell
as the Stokes case,39 contain only dicta, unsupported by sound
31 See BALLANTinE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 423.
3 2 Meredith v. N. J. Zinc & Iron Co, 55 N. J. Eq. 211, 37 Atl. 539 (1897),
aff'd without opinion, 56 N. J. Eq. 454, 41 Atl. 1116 (1893); Bonnet v.
First National Bank, 24 Tem. Civ. App. 613, 60 S. W. 325 (1900); Bond v.
Atlantic Terra Cotta Co., 137 App. Div. 671, 122 N. Y. Supp. 425 (1st
Dep't 1910); Archer v. Hesse, 164 App. Div. 493, 150 N. Y. Supp. 296 (1st
Dep't 1914) ; Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 285, 78 N. E. 1090
(1906), 12 L. R. A. (x.s.) 969 (1908), 9 ANx. CAs. 748 (1903).
3 Supra note 32.
' Ibid. 220, 37 AtL at 542.
3 70 N. J. Eq. 17, 62 AtL 553 (1905).
'1 Svpra note 32.
3 Supra note 32.
38 Supra note 32.
30 Supra note 32.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
.argument or by authority, to the effect that the pre-emptive right
does not apply where shares are exchafged for property.
The strongest argument against permitting pre-emptive rights
where shares are created for property is that the board of direc-
tors, in the sound and honest exercise of their discretion, may
have determined that a particular piece of property, which can
be obtained only in exchange for shares, is practically indispen-
sable to the corporate enterprise, and that they should not be
hampered in their fair conduct of the corporation's affairs. This
raises the issue whether the right of the existing shareholders
not to have their voting control disturbed, or the right of the
directors to be unhampered in managing the corporation, is of
paramount importance. But this problem is not unique to the
creations of shares for property. The same conflict may arise
when the board of directors desires to create for cash certain
shares in a person whom they believe it would be extremely de-
sirable to have as a shareholder. And if the recognition of share-
holders' voting control is of paramount importance when shares
are created for cash, there would seem to be no justification for
adopting a contrary attitude when it is sought to create shares
for property or services.
If Corporation C has an authorized capital stock of 1300 com-
mon shares, of which 1000 are outstanding, and a majority of
the board of directors holds 490 shares, surely the majority mem-
bers of the board ought not to be privileged to perpetuate them-
selves in office by creating the remaining 300 shares in
themselves in return for Blackacre, without offering an aliquot
portion of these 300 shares to the holders of 51% of the shares
then outstanding, even assuming that Blackacre is reasonably
worth 300 shares and that its acquisition would be highly bene-
ficial to the corporation. If it be urged that principles of equity
would preclude such a transaction by the directors, this is but
another method of alleging the incorrectness of the statement
that pre-emptive rights do not apply when shares are created for
property. And it should be noted that the cases in which the pro-
tection afforded by the pre-emptive right is of most importance
usually involve just such questions of control.
It may well be that the existence of any pre-emptive right is
open to attack, but that is a question beyond the scope of this
paper, and in any event ought not to be raised by an illogical
and back-door exception to the widely recognized general prin-
ciple.
DO PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS APPLY TO TREASURY SHARES?
The paucity of authority concerning the applicability of the
pre-emptive right to "treasury shares" is almost as complete as
with respect to the creation of shares for property. One very
SHAREHOLDERS' PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS
ancient case, Hart ridge v. Rockwell,"' held that the pre-emptive
right did not apply to "treasury shares," that is, where the corpo-
ration was about to exercise a power to create shares which
power it acquired through the previous purchase of some of its
own shares, an injunction was not granted to a shareholder to
whom none of such shares had been offered by the corporation;
but the case does not indicate whether the shares were purchased
with an intention of exercising the power thus acquired to create
shares, or how long an interval elapsed between the acquisition
of this power and its attempted exercise. The case of Crosby v.
Stratton,41 which was in fact a damage action by one shareholder
against another for an alleged conversion of shares, contains a
dictum to the effect that no pre-emptive right attaches to a power
to create shares acquired by the corporation through the trans-
fer to it by its shareholders of over 700,000 shares; but again the
evidence is unsatisfactory as to the character of this transfer
or its duration, although there is nothing to indicate a lack of
intention on the part of the corporation eventually to exercise
the power thus acquired. The case of State v. Smith 4 has been
cited as authority for the proposition that pre-emptive rights
do not apply to "treasury shares," but it in fact merely decides
that when a corporation buys some of its own shares this does
not effect a reduction in its authorized capital stock (that is, in
its total power to create shares), but that following such pur-,
chase of shares the corporation has power to create new share-
holdership in other persons in lieu of that which was cancelled
when the corporation bought the shares.
The recent case of Borg v. Intrenatiozal S licr Co.43 sustains
the proposition that pre-emptive rights do not apply to "treasury
shares" if the corporation has consistently indicated an inten-
tion thereafter to exercise the power to create other shares in
lieu of the shares cancelled; in the instant case the defendant
corporation had for fifteen years described the cancelled shares
in its annual balance sheets as "in treasury." On the other hand,
the case of Dvtmn v. Acme Auto amd Garage Co. specifically
supports the position that where a corporation purchases some
of its own shares, and there are no attendant circumstances to
indicate a future intention to exercise the power thus acquired
to create shares, pre-emptive rights apply to these "treasury
shares" to the same extent as to any other creation of shares
by the corporation. Rosenberry says in his opinion:
402 Charlton 260 (Ga. 1828).
4117 Colo. App. 212, 68 Pac. 130 (1902).
248 Vt 266 (1876).
48 11 F. (2d) 147 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
44168 Wis. 128, 169 N. W. 297 (1918).
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"What is the effect, then, of a lawful purchase of its
own capital stock by a corporation? If retired, can-
celled, and placed in the treasury of the company and
not reissued, manifestly its effect is to decrease the out-
standing capital stock. When the capital stock of the
corporation has been decreased and it is proposed to
reissue the repurchased stock, every reason for making
such reissue proportionate to the holdings of the then
stockholders exists that would exist if such increase
were of stock not theretofore issued or an increase in
the authorized capital .... It seems fairly clear that the
corporation did not treat the stock repurchases as a
liability; in fact it did not appear on either side of its
books. Under such circumstances, the corporation hav-
ing lawfully purchased and then retired its own shares,
and having statutory power to diminish its capital stock,
it must be held that the outstanding capital stock is
thereby diminished.... It further appears that the com-
pany continued after the retirement of the stock to do a
profitable business, and under such circumstances the
rule that the directors of a corporation cannot author-
ize a sale or an increase of capital stock either by
formally increasing the amount originally authorized
or by issuing that which had originally been withheld,
without first giving to all its existing stockholders an
opportunity to take their proportionate share of such
increase, applies to such proposed reissue, and the
attempt of the directors to reissue such stock without
first offering it to the then stockholders of the company
was unlawful, and such sale should not have been
authorized. A different question would have been pre-
sented if the shares of its own stock purchased by the
corporation had been carried on its books as a liability
and they had been treated as an asset of the corpo-
ration .. "'5
These cases are a far cry from the conclusion that pre-emptive
rights do not apply to "treasury shares." To be sure the Borg
case exempts from pre-emption those voting "treasury shares"
which can be said to have been temporarily cancelled, but this
is an illogical exception to the pre-emptive right rule and opens
the door to the very abuses which the right is aimed against.
This danger is exemplified by the facts in Elliott v. Baker 40 ; in
that case the court ordered the cancellation of voting "treasury
shares" which had been sold by the corporation at their then
market value to friends of certain directors without first being
offered proportionately to the complainants who were thereby de-
prived of voting control. Furthermore these "treasury shares"
had been merely temporarily cancelled as they had resulted from
the donation to the corporation of fully paid shares with
45 Ibid. 135, 169 N. W. at 300.
46194 Mass. 518, 80 N. E. 450 (1907).
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the understanding that they were to be resold for the benefit
of the corporation at the discretion of the directors.
CONCLUSION
The Elliott case, and in fact most of the cases in which a par-
ticular distribution of additional shares has been held to violate
rights of existing shareholders, might be regarded merely as a
specific application of the single principle that directors must
deal fairly with shareholders in the matter of creating new
shares. Such a principle, however, is of little aid in the anticipa-
tion or solution of a controversy. It is fundamental that direc-
tors must at all times and in all matters be free from fraud in
their relations with their shareholders. But fraud and fair deal-
ing are unfortunately not self-explanatory; even sensitive con-
sciences will vary in their reactions to a given situation. Hence
specific rules are needed. Two such rules have been set forth
in the foregoing pages: (1) the rule of pre-emption as to voting
shares, and (2) the rule that no shares shall be created at a price
which would adversely affect the interests of an existing share-
holder as to net earnings or net assets, unless he is afforded an
opportunity to subscribe at the price offered for a sufficient num-
ber of new shares to enable him to maintain unimpaired his
existing interests.
This latter rule is infinitely the more difficult of application
and, therefore, must be meticulously distinguished from the rule
of pre-emption. Where a complex share structure exists there
may be an impossibility of determining the proportion of new
shares at the price offered which an existing shareholder would
have to acquire in order to protect his interests in net earnings
and net assets. Moreover, this rule and the rule of pre-emption
may conflict where the rights of various classes of shareholders
are involved. Under such circumstances the plan for the crea-
tion of the additional shares, as originally proposed by the direc-
tors, may have to be altered, perhaps by offering the shares at
their reasonable sale value, or by permitting holders of different
classes of shares to subscribe for similar proportions of shares
of their respective classes.
